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EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY AND WEIGHT OF PHOTOGRAPHS-In a prosecution for fellatio,1 the people's only witness was a woman who testified
that she had participated in the alleged activity with the defendant. Her
testimony also verified for introduction a motion picture purporting to
show the alleged violations. Defendant was convicted on the basis of this
evidence. On appeal, held, reversed. A conviction cannot be sustained on
the basis of an accomplice's uncorroborated testimony; 2 and the film, although properly admitted, could not supply the necessary corroboration,
since a determination of its accuracy must rely upon the accomplice's
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foundation testimony. People v. Bowley, 59 Cal. 2d 855, 31 Cal. Rptr. 471,
382 P.2d 591 (1963).
The statute which was dispositive of the instant case provides a safeguard against convictions resting solely on an accomplice's testimony. It
clearly does not operate to prevent an accomplice from testifying3 or
from laying the foundation for the introduction of demonstrative evidence. 4 The statute, however, provides that an accomplice's testimony is
insufficient to support a conviction unless there is independent corroboration connecting defendant with the crime.5 The question, therefore, was
whether the film furnished such corroboration within the meaning of the
statute.
In passing on this question, the court was required to examine the
theoretical basis on which photographs and motion pictures are admitted
into evidence.6 This problem has been the subject of a controversy focused
primarily upon the evidentiary value of the photograph and the criteria
for determining admissibility. When photographs were first used as evidence, they were generally admitted on the same basis as maps, diagrams,
and models, since this afforded a convenient precedential link with prior
decisions. 7 This is now the most common practice, and a photograph is
admitted after a foundation is established by fulfilling two requirements:
first, a witness must demonstrate the relevance of the photograph to facts
in issue by identifying the picture; 8 and he must also verify it on the basis
of personal knowledge as an accurate representation of those facts. 9 Dean
Wigmore argued that these requirements are indispensable10 and urged
that a photograph should have evidentiary value only when verified by a
witness on the basis of personal observation.11 He argued that the function
of a photograph, like that of maps and diagrams, is to communicate to
the trier of fact information which the verifying witness has seen; as such,
it is merely the witness' "pictured expression" of data which he has observed.12 Thus, after being admitted, a photograph would be considered
part of the testimony of the witness who verified it.18
However, this theory would appear to exclude, for instance, the mes 19 CAL. JUR. 2d Evidence § 497 (1954).
People v. Santos, 134 Cal. App. 2d 738, 26 P.2d 522 (1933).
People v. MacEwing, 45 Cal. 2d 218, 288 P.2d 257 (1955); People v. Wynkoop, 165 Cal.
App. 2d 540, 331 P.2d 1040 (1958).
6 There is no ground for distinguishing between still and motion pictures as
evidence. People v. Dabb, 32 Cal. 2d 491, 197 P.2d 1 (1948); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 798a,
at 203 (3d ed. 1940).
7 Scorr, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 601, at 474 (1942).
s People v. Cunha, 107 Cal. App. 2d 382, 237 P.2d 12 (1951); McCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 181, at 387 (1954).
o People v. Ah Lee, 164 Cal. 350, 128 Pac. 1035 (1912); McCORMICK, op. cit. supra
note 8, § 181, at 387.
10 W1cMoRE, op. cit. supra note 6, § 790.
•
11 Compare WmMoRE, op. cit. supra note 6, § 790, with id. § 793, at 186.
12 Id. § 792, at 178.
13 Id. § 793, at 186.
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chanically tripped picture of a burglar taken as he entered a building or the
blown-up crowd scene placing the defendant at the scene of the crime.
Examples such as these have troubled the commentators, and, although
recognizing the necessity for verification of some kind, they have receded
from the position that the "pictured expression" theory is the only rationale
for admission of photographs. It is argued that, although verification by an
eyewitness provides a sufficient basis for the admission of a photograph,
such a basis is not a sine qua non of admissibility.14 It is further urged that
a photograph should not be limited to communicating testimony and that
once a proper foundation is established, a photograph may stand as an
"independent witness," having its own probative force. 15 In People v.
Doggett16 the California Court of Appeals impliedly accepted this analysis.
That case involved the prosecution of a husband and wife for fellatio, the
evidence against the man consisting of photographs apparently taken by
the defendants in their apartment. Since there was no eyewitness, the
photographs were identified by the defendants' landlord and verified by
an expert who testified that they were not composites or "faked." It was
held that the photographs were properly admitted, and the conviction was
sustained.
It was against this background that the court approached the principal
case. Unlike the Doggett problem, the decisive question here was not the
admissibility of photographic evidence, but its status after admission.
Doggett was useful only in defining the relationship between the film and
its foundation testimony. The court in the principal case pointed out that
under the "pictured expression" theory, the film could not corroborate
the woman's testimony, in that it would be part of her testimony. But,
since the court approved the analysis of the Doggett case and adopted the
"independent witness" theory, it could not base its decision on this ground.
Instead, it pointed out that in order for any photograph to .be admitted
into evidence it must be shown to be an accurate portrayal. In the principal
case, the accomplices' testimony provided this basis. But this brought the
policy of the statute into play, since the film could furnish corroboration
only if it was assumed to be accurate, and the determination of accuracy
relied on the accomplice's inherently suspect testimony.17 As a result, the
conviction rested solely on the testimony of an accomplice and fell within
the prohibition of the statute. This result is clearly required by the statute,
for the court's logic is unassailable. The court properly pointed out that
14
§

197.

State v. Tatum, 58 Wash. 2d 73, 360 P.2d 754 (1961); Scorr, op. cit. supra note 7,

15 Baustian v. Young, 152 Mo. 317, 63 s.w. 921 (1899) (dictum); MCKELVEY, EVIDENCE
382, at 671 (5th ed. 1944). The labels "independent witness" and "pictured expression"
have been coined by the writer for convenient references. The theories are not usually
referred to by these names.
10 83 Cal. App. 2d 405, 188 P .2d 792 (1948).
17 Cf. People v. Coffey, 161 Cal. 433, 119 Pac. 901 (1911).
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to allow the film to furnish corroboration would be to allow the prosecution to lift itself by its bootstraps.
Apart from the construction placed on the statute, the most provocative
aspect of the decision was the court's approval of the "independent witness"
theory. The basic difference between this theory and the "pictured expression" view is suggested by a closer examination of the Doggett case. Since
the verifying testimony in Doggett dealt only with the question of whether
the photographs had been faked, there must have been some premise to
fill the logical gap between this testimony and the conclusion that the
photographs portrayed events which actually occurred. This premise assumes the form of, in effect, judicial notice of the reliability of the photographic process.18 Such recognition does not seem particularly surprising,
for it is general knowledge that a camera records actual events. When such
notice is taken, the function served by verification is to show that a photograph is not faked or distorted. Verification under the "pictured expression"
analysis seems to have a different significance, for the theory does not recognize the testimonial properties of the photograph.19 It regards the photo•
graph as merely a mode of communicating to the trier of fact what the
verifying witness saw. 20 Thus, within the framework of the "pictured expression" theory, verification is probably best seen as a method of projecting a witness' testimony in pictorial form.
Theoretically, this difference would affect the weight which each view
accords a photograph.21 Under the "independent witness" theory, once it
has been clearly established that a photograph is accurate and that accuracy is unchallenged, it would be conclusive as to all matters it portrays.22 In contrast, under the "pictured expression" theory, the weight
attributed to a photograph would be the same as if the testimony were
oral. As a practical matter, this seems to be unrealistic. In light of the
widespread knowledge of the abilities of the camera, it seems quite improbable that a court (and especially a jury) would disregard an unimpeached
photograph because it conflicts with oral testimony.23 Nor would it seem
18 A large number of courts have taken such notice. E.g., Rice v. United States,
179 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir. 1949); State v. Mathison, 130 Iowa 440, 103 N.W. 137 (1905);
State v. Evans, 152 Mo. 317, 53 S.W. 921 (1899). Photographs are especially reliable where
the fact in issue is a general representation of objects and ordinary camera distortion is
not a material consideration. See Cunningham v. Fairhaven &: W. Ry., 72 Conn. 244, 43
Atl. 1047 (1899).
19 See WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 6, § 790.
20 Id. § 793.
21 Weight is usually a jury question. E.g., Wetherell v. Hollister, 73 Conn. 662, 48 Atl.
826 (1901); Martin Parry Corp. v. Bemer, 259 Mich. 621, 244 N.W. 180 (1932). However,
many courts in reviewing evidence on appeal have considered the weight of a photograph.
E.g., Hartley v. A. I. Rodd Lumber Co., 282 Mich. 652, 276 N.W. 712 (1937); Mobile &:
O.R.R. v. Bryant, 159 Miss. 528, 132 So. 539 (1931).
22 This principle has been occasionally referred to as the "incontrovertible physical
fact rule." See Mobile &: O.R.R. v. Bryant, supra note 21, at 537, 132 So. at 541; Sc01T,
op. cit. supra note 7, § 607.
23 Cf. McCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 8, § 183, at 392.
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proper that it should.24 Moreover, if a court recognizes the characteristics of
the photograph, it should also admit into evidence a picture that is verified
solely by an expert, as in Doggett, because such recognition is an implicit
adoption of the "independent witness" theory. As a practical matter, it is
unlikely that many courts would follow the "pictured expression" analysis
very strictly, and, in fact, no case has been found in which a photograph
was excluded after being verified solely by an expert.25 The fallacy in
the theory lies in the assumption that a photograph is merely a means of
communication; this seems to be contrary to fact. While the theory might
be justified on the ground that it provides a safeguard against distorted
and faked photography, this problem can be dealt with separately. It
should not necessitate resort to a theory which does not take into account
modern knowledge about the camera.

James W. Collier

24 See Franklin v. State, 69 Ga. 36 (1882); Gardner, The Camera Goes to Court,
24 N.C.L. REv. 233 (1946).
25 The instances where a party to a suit attempts to use this method of verification
are admittedly rare; consequently, it is perhaps dangerous to generalize on the question.
However, it would be quite inconsistent for a court to recognize that photographs are
generally accurate and reject a photograph when an expert has shown it is not faked or
distorted.

